Deeming Clause | Legal Fictions | Case Reference

Deeming Clause

The term 'deem' is derived from the old English word 'domas' which meant 'judgment or law'. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary provides the following meanings: 'to come to think or judge: consider; to have an opinion: believe.'

In Black's Law Dictionary, the word 'deem' has been defined in the following way:

'to treat (something) as if (1) it were really something else, or (2) it had qualities that it does not have.'

Bennion Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed. 1997, p. 735), states: 'Deeming provisions'- Acts often deem things to be what they are not. In construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose.

It is well settled position of law that a deeming provision is an admission of the non- existence of the fact deemed. The Legislature is competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not even exist. It means that the Courts must assume that such a state of affairs exists as real, and should imagine as real the consequences and incidents which inevitably flow there from, and give effect to the same. Md. Taherul Islam-Vs.-Jatiya Sangsad (Obaidul Hassan, J [[2024] 30 ALR (AD) 1]

When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. State of Bombay Vs. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar, AIR 1953 SC 244

Legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose. .....a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. Bengal Immunity Company Limited Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1955 SC 661

it is by now well settled by innumerable judgments of various courts including this Court, that when a statute enacts that anything shall be deemed to be some other thing the only meaning possible is that whereas that the said thing is not in reality that something, the legislative enactment requires it to be treated as if it is so. Similarly, though full effect must be given to the legal fiction, it should not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction has been created and all the more, when the deeming clause itself confines, as in the present case, the creation of fiction for only a limited purpose as indicated therein. Prakash H. Jain Vs. Marie Fernandes, (2003) 8 SCC 431

The language employed in sub-section (2) of Section 36 has to be closely scrutinised. A Labour Court is not a Civil Court at all. It is only by a legal fiction or a statutory hypothesis that it is to be treated as a Civil Court.    Pubali Bank Vs. The Chairman, First Labour Court, Dhaka and another, reported in 44 DLR (1992) 40

As the analogy only arises by legal fiction, it must be limited to the purposes enacted by the context and cannot be given larger effect.  Radha Kissen Chamria and others Vs. Durga Prasad Chamria, AIR 1940 PC 167

Legal fictions are only for definite purposes and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Vadilal Lallu Bhai. AIR 1973 (SC) 1016.

The legal fiction created thereby was for a limited purpose of enabling the certificate holder to execute the decree and to satisfy his own claim out of the proceeds of such execution, but he was not in a position of an assignee of the decree so as to acquire all the rights of the original decree holder in the decree. Radha Kissen Chamaria vs Durga Prashad Chamaria, reported in AIR 1940 PC 167.

It is well settled that the legal fiction must be extended to its logical conclusion and at the same time it should be construed strictly. The High Court Division in the impugned judgment observed that a deeming clause in the Constitution, has to be interpreted taking into consideration of various factors depending on the backdrop due to which the same was incorporated, legislative intent for incorporation of such clause vis a vis the manner of application of such deeming clause. We endorse the above observation of the High court Division. Md. Taherul Islam-Vs.-Jatiya Sangsad (Obaidul Hassan, J [[2024] 30 ALR (AD) 1]