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Suit Valuation Act, 1887 | BD Kanoon

Valuation in partition suit, Partition suit where plaintiff is out of possession, recovery of money or land,
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সতর্কীকরণ! বিডি কানুনে প্রকাশিত অধিকাংশ নজীর বিভিন্ন বই ও ওয়েবসাইট থেকে সংগ্রহ করা হয়েছে। এই সকল নজীর এর সঠিকতার বিষয়ে বিডি কানুন কোন নিশ্চয়তা প্রদান করে না। বিডি কানুনে প্রকাশিত নজীর এর উপর নির্ভর এর আগে সংশ্লিষ্ট নজীরটির রেফারেন্স মিলিয়ে নেওয়ার অনুরোধ করা হচ্ছে।

S. 3—Appeal in land suit or suit concerning interest in land—Forum is determined by valuation determined under the rules and not by market value.

The forum of appeals in land suits or interest in the land for the purposes of section 18 of the Ordinance the determining factor would be the value of original suit determined under rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act for the purposes of jurisdiction, and not the market value of the subject- matter of the suit. Maqarrab Khan Vs. MoM. An- war Khan PLD 1964 (WP) Peshawar 228=PLR 1965 (2) WP 168=PLR 1965 (1) WP 527 (DB) (Daud, I).

 

S. 8—Suit falling under s. 7(iv)(l) Court-Fees Act—Valuation for Court-Fee and jurisdiction is the same.

In a suit for rendition of accounts the plaintiff must state the amount at which he values the relief sought. In such a suit the crucial value is value of the relief and the plaintiff need not state any value for purposes of jurisdiction because it will be the same as laid down in section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. The value for purposes of jurisdiction inadvertently stated in the plaint, therefore, cannot be taken to be value for purposes of relief claimed.

Suleiman Khan Vs. Muhammad Zaman Khan, PLD 1961 AzadJ. & K48 (DB) (Shah, CJ).

 

S. 8—Valuation in partition suit where the plaintiff is out of possession.

In a partition suit where the plaintiff is excluded from possession section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act now applies and the valuation given for the purpose of court-fees must also be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. The proper method is first to make the valuation for the purpose of court-fees, and then to take that value for the purposes of jurisdiction and not vice versa.

Patak Ch. Haldar Vs. Sademan Howladar (1957,19 DLR 190.

 

—Partition suit where plaintiff is out of possession.

In a suit for partition where the plaintiff is excluded from possession, court-fees must be paid ad valorem according to the market value of the plaintiff’s share in respect of which the suit is instituted and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction must also be determined by the same value which has been computed for court-fees.

Khayertullah Mondal Vs. Katnalakanta Saha (1960) 12 DLR (FB) 329 (331).

 

Ss. 8 & 11—Valuation for the purpose of court’s jurisdiction in a partition Suit where plaintiff is in possession is determinable by the value of the plaintiffs share in the entire property.

[Held by the majority, accepting AR Cornelius, CJ, disagreeing.] In a suit for partition of joint property by a person, claiming to be in joint possession, the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction is determined by the value of the share of the plaintiff in the property and not by the value of the whole property.

In a suit for partition, where the plaintiff is excluded from possession, the plaintiff has to pay ad-valorem court-fees on the market value of the share claimed by him and that value also determines the forum of the trial or appeal. It is difficult to appreciate why in a case for partition, where the plaintiff is in joint possession he must be given the benefit of having his suit tried or his appeal heard by a higher tribunal by valuing his suit according to the value of the entire property sought to be partitioned.

Ajizuddin V. Rahman Fakir (1961)13 DLR SC) 191.

 

—Valuation of a suit—Plaintiff’s absolute discretion In a Suit coining under section 7 (IV) (c) of Court-fees Act having, as regards its valuation, no objective standard available, nor have any rules been framed by the High Court under scc9 of mc Suits Valuation Act, plaintiff has a discretion as to the amount at which the relief is to be valued and the court has no power to revise such valuation.

Star Film Vs. Sargam Pictures (1954) 6 DLR 466.

Sections 8 and 11—

 

The Full Bench considering sections 6, 22, 24 and Order XLVIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 as amended by the Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2001, sections 8,11,19 and 21 of the Civil Courts Act, 1887 and other relevant provi­sions of law has come to the conclusion that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear the revisional application against the order of the Joint District Judge in a suit the valuation of which is above Tk. 5,00,000 (Taka five lac) and in such matters the revisional application shall lie before the High Court Division under section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

 

Bangladesh vs AHM Khurshed All 13 BLC (AD) 114

 

S. 9—Plaintiff’s discretion to value

In a suit coming under section 7(iv) (c) of the Court-Fees Act, having, as regards its valuation, no objective standard available, nor have any rules been framed by the High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, plaintiff has a discretion as to the amount at which the relief is to be valued and the court has no power to revise such valuation.

Star Film Distributors Vs. Sujan Pictures (1954) 6 DLR 466 (468 rt.h.col),

 

—Provisions of section 8(c) of the Court-fees Act are independent of section 9 of the Suit Valuation Act.

The Court is authorized under section 8(c) of the Court-fees Act to hold an enquiry as to valuation of any suit and to assess the same. This is absolutely an independent power consciously given by the legislature to the Court and the legislature must be presumed to have in its mind the provision of Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.

Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act is not only an independent section but is also contained in a different Act.

Govt. -of East Pakistan Vs. Maharaja King Bikram (1968) 20 DLR 77.

 

S. 9—Section 8C Court Fees Act, gives the Court power to revise the valuation of any suit. But that does not improve matters as regards cases dealt with in section 7(iv)(c) inasmuch as it does not indicate any method or principle by which the court can revise the plaintiff’s valuation in cases where there is no objective standard.

Star Film Vs. Sargam Pictures (1954) 6 DLR 466.

 

—In suits for recovery of money or land, there is obviously an objective basis for valuation, namely, the amount of the money to be recovered or the market value of the land.

Kumudini Welfare Trust Vs. Pakistan (1959)11 DLR 57.

 

—Valuation of suit. It is the duty of the Court to enquire into the proper valuation of a suit when it has grounds to consider that the valuation given by the party is not correct. AIR 1925 (Pal) 392 (FB)+AIR 1930 (Cal) 65 (DB).

 

S. 11—Objection to jurisdiction.

Objection as to trial courts jurisdiction to try a suit on the ground that it was undervalued was raised in the trial Court but that Court-while disposing of this objection fell in an error by repeating undervaluation.

On appeal the lower appellate Court found that on a proper valuation suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court and on that finding remanded the case with a direction that the plaint is returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court.

Held: Objection to jurisdiction having been raised in the court of first instance, the court of the Appeal below rightly held that the judgment and the decree of the trial Court were hit by the want of jurisdiction.

Decision of the trial Court regarding valuation made not only for the purpose of court fees but for the purpose of ascertaining the jurisdiction as well is open to correction in appeal.

But where objection as to valuation was for the first time raised in the second appeal, then in view of the provision of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, objection to the jurisdiction of a court based on over-valuation or under-valuation should not be entertained by an appellate Court unless there was prejudice on merits. If the objection as to jurisdiction is taken in the court of the first instance, there is hardly any scope for the application of section 11.

Nagendra N. Sen Roy Vs. Saiyad Ali Jamadar. (1956)8 DLR 100.

 

—The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 CPC and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed .purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in a failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.

Nagendra N. Sen Ray Vs. Saiyad Ali Jamadar (1956) 8 DLR 100.

(Per Cornelius, CJ)—As the point of valuation for purpose of jurisdiction was not taken in the Court of first instance, under s. 11 of the SV Act no omission on the ground of over-valuation or under valuation should have been entertained by the appellate Court, i.e. the High Court, even if that Court were of the opinion that ‘the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits”.

Azizuddin Vs. Rahman Fakir. (1961) 13 DLR (SC) 191.

 

S.11—If no objection as to valuation of a suit is taken either in the trial or appellate court—No further objection will be allowed, especially if the party concerned has not been prejudiced in any mater.

Gopal Krishna Das Vs. Abdul Kadr Mia (1983) 35 DLR 14 (15).

 

Supreme Court

Appeal to the Supreme Court competent, being an order against the Collector even though a departmental appeals, against the Collector’s order, has already been preferred and disposed of by the Board of Revenue.

Messers S. A. Haroon Vs. Collector of Customs, Karachi (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 472.

 

—Person appearing before the Supreme Court being an advocate has to make submission in English language.

Shamsuddin Ahmed Vs. Registrar, High Court of E. Pak. (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 483.

 

—Question of fact—Interference by the Supreme Court on question of fact is permissible not only when apparent blunder or error committed by lower Court but also when the finding is patently absurd and also it is physically impossible.

The Privy Council itself recognized that it would not hesitate to review the evidence in spite of a concurrent finding of the Courts below if “it be shown with absolute clearness that some blunder or error is apparent in the way in which the learned Judges below have dealt with the facts” or “if there had been any principle of evidence not properly applied.” But this at best is a rule of practice only which has gradually developed as a result of the decisions of the Board which are merely illustrative and by no means exhaustive.

Federation of Pakistan Vs. Ali Ihsan (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 251.

 

—Supreme Court—State duty to comply with the order of the Supreme Court— Unseemly hurry in passing the order under review deprecated.

it is indeed unfortunate that there was an unseemly hurry on the part of the State to pass the second order of forfeiture without first having fully complied with the order of the Supreme Court in letter and in spirit. It was desirable for the State to act in such a manner as to avoid giving any impression whatsoever that it might have acted on a consideration other than purely in the interest of the State and its people.

Tofazzal Hossain Vs. Province of East Pak. (1967)19 DLR 529.

 

—Supreme Court’s ruling—Executive Government’s duty to obey the same in letter and spirit.

AM Sayem, J— I have been greatly distressed at the manner of implementation, a mere feigning as it is, of the interim order passed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court directing restoration of the press to the petitioner, and the stage at which the impugned order was passed, though the learned Attorney-General insisted that these did not at all concern us and were matters solely between the Supreme Court and some of the respondents.

Tofazzal Hossain Vs. Province of East Pak. (1967)19 DLR 529.

 

—Obiter of the Supreme Court—Any observation by the Supreme Court even obiter is binding on the High Court.

M. Ismail and Sons Vs. Trans Oceanic Steamship Co. Ltd. (1965) 17 DLR 269.

 

—Appeal to the Supreme Court— Point involving inquiry into facts cannot generally be allowed to be raised for the 1st time.

Points involving inquiry into facts or as to which there could have been an answer on facts, if they were raised in the trial Court, cannot in the absence of strong reasons justifying such a course, be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal.

Whether both parties were ignorant of the law on a particular date is a question of fact which could only be decided after an investigation and there was no good ground for its being allowed to be raised as an additional ground of appeal.

Haji Abdullah Khaiz Vs. Niso Mohammad Khan (1965) 17 DLR (SC) 481.

 

—Appeal by special leave to Supreme Court— Maintainability of objection—Objection not mentioned in the concise statement cannot be raised for the first time at the time of argument.

Taj Din Vs. Mrs. Razia Begum (1973) 25 DLR (SC) 13

 

Concurrent finding of fact—When it does and when does not interfere.

The Supreme Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in civil matters, unless that finding is shown to be based on no evidence or upon mis-reading of the evidence. No such error has been pointed out to us. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that the finding as to the incomplete nature of the gift was open to any challenge at this stage.

Abdullah Vs. Abdul Karim (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 205.

 

—Reversal of findings of fact. Supreme Court sets aside findings of fact arrived at by the High Court.

The High Court in setting aside the finding with regard to collusion arrived at by the Trial Court

has not taken into account the following circumstances: It has not considered the finding by the Trial Court that it could not be believed that the defendant No. 1 would allow a property worth Rs. 15,000/- to be sold for Rs. 3,700/- for his failure to pay the paltry sum of Rs. 300/-which was due on account of municipal Lax. The Trial Court observed that “the PWs appeared to be more reliable than the DWs and I accept the evidence of PWs that the defendant No. 1 is still in possession and the defendant No. 4 has no possession”. This finding has also been reversed without giving any cogent reasons thereof. Regard being had to these facts we are unable to sustain the finding of the High Court.

Tripura Modern Bank Ltd. Vs. Khan Bahadur Khalilur Rahman (1973) 25 DLR (SC) 34.

 

Supreme Court’s decision—Binding on all courts, including the High Courts.

It is necessary to point out to the learned Judges of the High Court the constitutional duty that any decision of the Supreme Court shall to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law is binding on all other Courts in Pakistan and that all judicial authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.

Chowdhury Muhammad Khan Vs. Sanaullah, (1973) 25 DLR (SC) 45.

 

—Supreme Court’s power of superintendence—Dictum of the Supreme Court of India recalled.

It is interesting to note that though the power of superintendence has been cornered on the High Court, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Baldeo Singh, AIR 1957 SC) 612, is an authority for the proposition that the Supreme Court (in our country the Appellate Division) can also exercise the power of superintendence in the appropriate circumstances.

AT Mridha Vs. State (1973) 25 DLR 335.

 

—Application for special leave to appeal— Objection that the appeal did not lie before the High Court was not taken before the High Court—This fact was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court dealing with the application for special leave to appeal—Had it been so brought to its notice special leave would not have been granted.

M/s. Shirkag-i-Ahbab Vs. National Bank of Pakistan (1969) 21 DLR (SC) 275.

 

Jurisdiction—Matters which lie within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of Supreme Court cannot under a misapprehension be usurped by a High Court Divisions.

When the matter ultimately came before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court regarding the question of attachment of four Trawlers (belonging to the defendant) the Appellate Division passed an order to the effect that three Trawlers should be released from attachment order and only one will remain under attachment under Or. 38, r. 5, CP Code. It however appears that certain officer of the Government. allowed the 4th Trawler to go. Thereupon when the matter came before the High Court Division is proceeded to take certain penal action against the offending officer for violation of the Court order regarding the Trawler which has been allowed to go. The matter again came up before the Appellate Division on being moved by the officer concerned. Held: The High Court Division was under a clear misapprehension. If the party concerned violated the order regarding the attachment of the Trawler concerned it is the order of the Appellate Division which has been violated and therefore the High Court Division acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to take action against the offending officer. In these circumstances High Court Division’s order is infructuous.

Md. Muzaffar Hossain Vs. King Fishers Industries Ltd. (1984) 36DLR (AD) 102.

 

Superior authority’s interference.

When a subordinate authority is authorized to dispose of a matter it is legally seized of, any opinion by a higher authority in the performance of its duty is illegal and vitiated the legality of the order.

BS Industries Vs. Dy. Registrar (1968) 20 DLR 787.

 

—Fresh point involving investigation into facts disallowed in appeal

The point that appointment in Class I post by the Postmaster-General without the approval of the President was itself bad, was not raised before the High Court. This point when raised before the Supreme Court was disallowed since investigation into facts may be necessary to find out whether approval of the President was or was not obtained.

The Postmaster-General, Eastern Circle (EP) Vs. Muhammad Hashim (1971) 23 DLR (SC) 49.

 

—Supreme Court’s power of superintendence. The Supreme Court (in our country the Appellate Division) can exercise the power of superintendence in the appropriate circumstance.

AT Mridha Vs. The State (1973) 25 DLR 335.

আপনার কাঙ্খিত নজীরটি খুঁজে পাননি! এ বিষয়ে আরও নজীর পেতে নিচের বাটনে ক্লিক করুন।


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